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| Choosing what to believe might not make it a true belief |
The Human Concept of "Nothing"
Chance is often contrasted with belief systems such as fate or providence. To some, it appears the most logical conclusion based on observation. But that conclusion itself rests on an assumption.
To attribute something to “chance” is to assume—without proof—that some events occur randomly and without overarching purpose. This assumption often arises when we confront overwhelming complexity. When data become too vast, intricate, or opaque for us to discern a pattern, we may default to the label “chance.” In that sense, chance functions as a conceptual placeholder—a way of naming what we do not (yet) understand.
Ontological vs. Epistemic Chance
A helpful distinction can clarify matters. Ontological chance proposes that reality itself is fundamentally random. Epistemic chance, by contrast, suggests only that our knowledge is incomplete—we lack sufficient data to perceive the pattern.
Historically, many phenomena once attributed to chance—the turbulence of weather systems or the toss of a coin—have later been explained in terms of complex, though sometimes chaotic, physical processes. Labeling the unknown as “chance” can prematurely close the door to deeper inquiry.
Whether one looks at events and sees the hand of God, the gears of a machine, or the roll of the dice, interpretation is involved. Raw data do not interpret themselves. A lens is always applied.
The Common Denominator: Belief
A statistician might object that belief in an overarching purpose cannot be proved either. Fair enough. My point is not to prove providence. My point is narrower: both positions—ultimate randomness and ultimate purpose—require belief at some foundational level.
Many religious people openly admit this. They may argue their beliefs are supported by experience and reason, though not mathematically demonstrated. Few thoughtful believers claim absolute certainty; and when they do, careful questioning often reveals that what they call “knowledge” is better described as reasoned conviction.²
The issue becomes more subtle in scientific contexts.
The Trap of Scientism
Some scientists are careful to distinguish between model and metaphysics. Others, however—along with many lay interpreters of science—slide toward what is often called scientism: the assumption that a materialist framework is not merely useful, but exclusively true.³
Science, properly practiced, proposes hypotheses, tests models, refines explanations, and remains open to revision. Scientism, by contrast, quietly converts a working model into a comprehensive worldview. It treats explanatory success as ontological finality.
The irony is that this, too, involves belief. Not belief in superstition—but belief that a particular explanatory method exhausts the nature of reality.
Choosing the Lens
In the end, both the religious and the scientific-naturalist perspectives operate with foundational assumptions. To describe events as expressions of providence is interpretive. But so is describing them as the product of ultimate accident.
When we invoke “chance,” we are not escaping belief—we are exercising it. Just as “providence” can function as a theological placeholder, “chance” can function as a secular one.
The deeper question may not be whether belief is present, but which interpretive lens we find most coherent, most responsible, and most adequate to the totality of experience.
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¹ See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness
² Granted, there are always absolutists who claim certainty and resist examining their own assumptions.
³ One common definition of scientism.
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